Houthi and Al-Shabaab Partnership: Impact on Red Sea Security and US Response
The Houthi-Al-Shabaab alliance has emerged as a significant security concern in East Africa, reshaping regional dynamics, international shipping routes and challenging US interests.
Yemen and Somalia became center stage for a surprising turn of events March 15, 2025, when the United States hit multiple land targets destryoing missle launching sites in retalliation to Houthi missles trailing a US F-16 in the region. This incident highlights a growing alliance between Yemens Houthis and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab two ideologically distinct groups united by shared anti-American sentiment and strategic interests. Despite ideological differences between the Shia Houthis and Sunni Al-Shabaab, their partnership built on a common hate for one group lends itself to build bridges out of their enemies; to unite for a common cause. The principle, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
Behind this partnership, though ideologically unconventional, there is a rooted in a shared anti-American resistance. This alliance is part of a broader strategy to grind down secular American influence. Both groups see this opportunity as a time to advance their goals through mutual support. Reports dated July 2024 revealed an emerging collaboration between Yemen’s Ansar Allah (Houthis) and Somalia’s al-Shabaab militant group affiliated with al-Qaeda. UN reports confirm that al-Shabaab held at least two meetings with Houthi representatives in Somalia (July and September 2024), requesting advanced weapons and training, in exchange for increased piracy operations.
The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, indicated on October 2024 that the Houthis were “evaluating options to carry out attacks at sea from the Somali coast,” having transferred drones and missiles to Somalia. This plan never occurred, due to “Iran suffering setbacks in its conflict with Israel between July and December 2024.” According to Sakhri Mohamed, “To understand al-Shabaab’s relationship with the Houthies, it’s essential to consider broader Houthi-Al-Qaeda ties and Iran’s role in fostering their recent rapprochement.” Reports claim that Iranian shipment of weapons that were intended for the Houthis, many weapons found in the hands of al-Shabaab. As the African Report noted, “this likely reflects profit-drive arms trafficking rather than deliberate Iranian or Houthi support for al-Shabaab. Mohamed asserts that the AQAP, known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, holds the most power in the region, “enhancing incentives for cooperation based on mutual dependency rather than traditional ideological alignment.”
Al-Shabaab, opposing the Somali Federal Government, views the US as a proxy, according to CNN. United States assets in the region in proximity to al-Shabaab, give way for foreign U.S. assets to become target by al-Shabaab. ISIS claims a heavy presence in the region, with benefits the U.S., drawing weapons sources away from the US and towards the “intra-jihadist fighting between Shabaab and ISIS.”
From August through December of 2022, President Biden launched 18 airstrikes against al-Shabaab hideouts in Middle Juba, Middle Shabelle, Hiraan, Galgaduud, and Lower Shabelle regions…lending to a 30% increase in US airstrikes compare to 2021,” according to ACLED. However, some critics argue that the US, must remain focused on replacing counter terrorism and military solutions with negations, in order to bring stability to the region.Missing the point of addressing the root cause of instability in Somalia, thus, not placing emphasis on political reconciliation and verbally addressing governance issues; likely seem like utopia than reality.
The Houthis are reportedly discussing deals to provide al-Shabaab with advanced weapons systems, such as attack drones and surface-to-air missiles. In return, al-Shabaab offers financial resources generated through extortion, illicit trade, and taxation, which are critical for the Houthis, amid international sanctions. The Red Sea works as a highway benefiting an easy flow of mass amounts of weapons from Iran to Africa, as well as into Gaza. This corridor acts as a means to secure supplies, connecting Iran's proxy militias and rebels through the exchange of arms and resources more effectively than land routes. According to the Combatting Terrorism Center, “Securing supply chains and funding independent of Iran is a key objective for Houthi leadership.”
The Houthis in Yemen are looking to bolster their push for independence. They aim to expand their operations beyond Yemen into the Horn of Africa, leveraging ties with Al-Shabaab to strengthen their maritime presence in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. If the Houthis achieve their desired independence, they may gain support to expand their influence in these strategic waters. Iran plays a significant role in fostering alliances in this region. While direct evidence of Tehran’s involvement remains inconclusive, its broader strategy of empowering militant groups aligns with the Houthis’ collaboration with Al-Shabaab. Iranian shipments of weapons intended for the Houthis have reportedly ended up in the hands of Al-Shabaab, though this likely reflects profit-driven arms trafficking rather than deliberate Iranian or Houthi support for Al-Shabaab. According to Soufan Center, Tim Lenderking a team player in the Special Envoy for Yemen asserted that “the Houthis are providing weapons to al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda.” Moreover, “Additionally, increased smuggling activities, including small and light weapons (SALWs) are observed between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, with indications of shared military supplies or a common supplier,” according to the United Nations.
Recently, as of March 15, the global dynamic in the region is changing, with military, humanitarian, and political consequences. The immediate military impact has degraded Houthi capabilities, as U.S.-led airstrikes have targeted weapons depots, drone factories, and communication infrastructure. Notably, these strikes have reportedly killed key Houthi leaders, In retaliation, the Houthis fired 18 missiles at the USS Harry S Truman. The economic strain has also been playing a part, with intensified sanctions and the disruption of smuggling networks exacerbating the Houthis' economic challenges.
Despite these setbacks, the Houthis have vowed to expand attacks on shipping lanes and U.S. warships, leveraging their partnership with al-Shabaab. Recent UN and U.S. intelligence reports confirm Houthi-al-Shabaab negotiations to supply drones, missiles, and training in exchange for piracy revenue. Between November 2023 and mid-December 2024, the Houthis executed over 100 attacks on commercial and military vessels transiting the Bab al-Mandab Strait. This campaign significantly disrupted maritime traffic, reducing the number of passing ships from approximately 2,068 in November 2023 to 877 in October 2024. This disruption allowed the Houthis to impose a de facto naval blockade on one of the world’s critical trade corridors, generating an estimated $180 million monthly in illicit passage fees paid by shipping agents to ensure safe transit across the Red Sea without being attacked. As of March 2025, the global dynamic in the region is ebbing and flowing. Military, humanitarian and political consequences are a result of jihadist groups in the regions attempting to force power over their people, and the world through controlling shipping lanes for the benefit of increased weapon caches. The immediate military impact has down sized Houthi capabilities, as the US has targeted weapons depots, drone factories, and communication infrastructure.
The alliance poses a risk to the security of Ethiopia and Kenya while potentially reigniting piracy operations along shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. As Omar Mahmood, a senior Eastern Africa analyst, notes, “Yemen is often the arms market for Somalia,” underscoring how this partnership facilitates weapons transfers despite ideological differences.
The alliance between the Houthis and al-Shabaab represents a dangerous convergence of opportunistic interests. While U.S. airstrikes have temporarily weakened Houthi capabilities, their resilience and collaboration with regional militant groups like al-Shabaab threaten long-term stability in East Africa and the Middle East. Addressing this growing threat requires coordinated international efforts to disrupt smuggling networks and stabilize affected regions and bring stability to those who want peace in the region.